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SPECIAL REPORT
The sponsors of current proposals have mostly tailed
or refused to say what revenues they would hold constant
and have not presented evidence backing up their claims.
Bradley and Gephardt refuse to release data. Ouayle's
data show that hi$ 1984 plan l> neutral lor payroll and
individual Income taxes, but he (ails to specify the nature
of his corporate la* proposals, some of which bear on
Individual receipts also. Kemp and Kasten hint that their
bill Is actually a revenue loser but still call It revenueneulrat. The evidence on DeConclnl suggests his bill
could be either neutral or large revenue gainer.

More generally, bills that keep revenues constant for
lower-Income groups may do so by penalizing those who
ere poor and benefiting the well-to-do who appear to
have low Income lor tax purposes. Even calculating that a
bill is revenue-neutral requires making patently absurd
assumptions about taxpayer behavior. Finally, choosing
a revenue-neutral bill over one thai loses revenue msv
lead to perverse results for the deficit and the economy,
even on a static basis.
Perhaps that applause lor revenue neutrality should be
still fainter.

Chairman PICKLE. Mr. Woodbury, with the U pjohn Institute.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN A. WOODBURY, 3EN1OK RESEARCH
ECONOMIST, W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE FOR EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH

Mr. WOODBURY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be
here. I should mention immediately that I speak for myself and not
necessarily for the Upjohn Institute or Michigan State University
with which I am also affiliated.
What I would like to do is simply summarize my written testimo
ny and emphasize a few points. My comments will focus on three
issues. First, the growth of fringe benefits and reasons for that
growth. Second, fringe benefit coverage and the implications of
that pattern of coverage for income distribution. And third, equity
of the tax system and revenue losses that result from fringe benefit
exemption.
Everyone here is well aware of the dramatic growth of non-wage
benefits during the post-World War II years. The fact of fringe ben
efit growth is simply not controversial. There is more controversy I
believe over the causes of that growth. Several studies listed in my
testimony have found convincing evidence that the favorable tax
treatment of fringe benefits, that is their exemption from Federal
income and payroll taxes has had a highly significant impact on
employer provision of benefits.
Many readers of these studies and even one or two of the re
searchers themselves seem to have inferred from these studies that
favorable tax treatment is the major or even the only cause of
fringe benefit growth in recent years. I believe this is a serious
error and for two reasons. First, the same studies also find that a
variety of other factors have influenced fringe benefit growth; the
growth of real incomes and the aging of the labor force deserve
particular mention because they have increased right along with
the marginal income tax rate. Further, they seem to have a posi
tive effect on benefits of the same order of magnitude as do in
creases in the tax rate.
Second, I am less confident than some researchers that we have
successfully separated the effects of rising real incomes from the ef
fects of rising tax rates. This is a statistical issue I comment on
more fully in my written testimony.
Why does all this matter? It matters I think because one of the
most frequently used arguments against taxing fringe benefits is
that by so doinj* employer-provided fringe benefits, health and re
tirement plans in particular, would be reduced or even would dis-

appear. Statistical findings indicate this is simply not true. We
would blunt one incentive and one incentive only for further
growth of employer-provided benefits if we were to tax them.
The other forces behind fringe benefit growth would continue,
however. Insurance and pension plans would still be a better buy
when purchased through the employer. The work force would con
tinue to age. Employers would still use deferred benefits as a
means of reducing turnover. Real incomes would continue to grow.
So we would not kill the goose that laid the golden egg and witness
the demise of the voluntary fringe benefit system if we tax fringe
benefits.
About the distribution of fringe benefits I want to make Just one
point. Taken as a whole voluntarily provided benefits do increase
the inequality of the distribution of income. But there is one bene
fit, health insurance, that seems to be roughly proportionally dis
tributed. Health insurance it seems neither greatly increases nor
decreases the equality of the distribution of income.
Finally, a few words on the equity of the tax system and revenue
losses that result from fringe exemptions. It is quite clear that the
exemption of fringe benefits from taxation induces, introduces both
vertical and horizontal inequities into the tax system. That is,
those with greater ability to pay do not necessarily pay proportion
ally greater taxes. This follows from the fact that higher paid em
ployees also receive a higher proportion of their total compensation
as fringes on which they are not taxed. Also, two workers with the
same total compensation may pay quite different tax bills if one re
ceives only wage income wnereas the other receives some fringe
benefits. Finally, we are all acutely aware of the revenue losses re
sulting from the exemption of fringes.
The pure solution to these inequities and the revenue losses that
result is the subjection of all employer contributions to Federal
payroll and personal income taxes. Because of the opposition such
proposals would likely meet, and have met, a variety of proposals
to tax one benefit, health insurance, have been put forward.
Taxing health insurance contributions is an alluring prospect
and represents a step in the right direction, but suffers from two
important defects I feel. First, if we want to improve the equity of
the tax system health contributions should be the last benefit to
fully or partially tax, not the first. The reason again is that health
contributions alone among voluntarily provided fringes are distrib
uted roughly proportionally.
The second defect of capping health contributions alone or any
single contribution alone is that such an approach opens the door
to tax avoidance by substitution away from the newly taxed benefit
and towards still untaxed benefits. Such substitution is more than
merely an academic matter. It means the existing estimates of rev
enue gains resulting from taxing health contributions may be too
high. I should mention we have no microeconomic evidence at this
point on the degree to which pensions and health insurance are
substitutes. But developing such estimates should be a high priori
ty for research.
In short, to mitigate inequities in the present system a uniform
tax treatment of all benefits is required. Also, based on my own re
search and that of others I am unconvinced that taxation of em-
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ployer contributions would result in disappearance or even reduc
tion of fringe benefits.
I would therefore advocate a limit on the proportion of total com
pensation that could be provided without Federal payroll or person
al income taxation. This plan is similar to the second part of the
Munnell proposal, and it has three advantages. First, it is compre
hensive. Second, it focuses on the proportion of total compensation,
and so would obviate the wrangling that has taken place over
dollar sum caps on tax-free contributions to health insurance. Fi
nally, it would have a minimal effect on workers and their benefits
while it would forestall further erosion of the tax base.
Thank you.
Chairman PICKLE. Thank you.
[The prepared statement follows:]
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other "agreed upon" items rose from about five percent of total compensation in
1951 to 11.6 percent in 1982.2
In large part, these increases have been in the form of contributions to retirement
and (particularly) health-insurance plans whereas about 60 percent of voluntary
contributions were in the form of retirement and health benefits in 1948, nearly 84
percent of voluntary contributions were for retirement and health benefits in 19*82. 3
Although no one disputes the enormous of nonwage compensation, there is less
certainty about the causes of this growth. The litany of reasons for the provision of
fringe benefits includes: preferential treatment under the federal personal and cor
porate tax codes; economies of scale in the provision of pensions and insurance; ef
forts to improve workers' productivity and reduce turnover by deferring payment of
benefits; unionization; changing demographic composition of the labor force; and
rising real incomes.4
To what degree can each of these factors explain the growth of fringe-benefit pro
vision? Although there is substantial evidence that unions and collective bargaining
exert a positive independent effect on the provision of nonwage benefits, the stagna
tion of private-sector union growth since the 1950s makes unionism an unikely
-

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN A. WOODBURY, SENIOR RESEARCH ECONOMIST, W.E. UPJOHN
INSTITUTE FOR EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH*

THE TAX TREATMENT OF FRINGE BENEFITS: WHAT DO WE KNOW AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE
LEARNED?

.The rather frivolous appelation that has been given to nonwage benefits
"fringe" benefits tends to mask both the importance of these benefits to workers
and the far-reaching implications of their favored tax status. For it is difficult to
think of health care or retirement income plans as merel? decorative, peripheral, or
frilly parts of the compensation package in an age when wealth services account for
over five percent of national income and when over eleven percent of the population
is aged 65 or more. And further, the employer-provision of these benefits affects a
multitude of economic outcomes and behavior: the distribution of income and the
equity of that distribution; the size of the income and payroll tax bases and the
equity of the tax system; the use (or overuse) of the health-care system and the
timing of retirement.
What follows is a necessarily selective review of the burgeoning economic re
search on nonwage benefits specifically private pensions and health-insurance
plans and an equally selective summary of the lacunae in that research. The focus
is on a few questions that are of immediate importance to policy: How much have
nonwage benefits grown and why? Who is covered and what are the implications of
the existing pattern of coverage for income distribution? What changes in the tax
treatment of nonwage benefits would yield significant revenue gains, and what are
the implications of these changes for the equity of the tax system? What are some of
the significant effects of employer-provision of benefits on workers' behavior and
how do these induced behaviors affect in turn other economic outcomes?
HOW MUCH, AND WHY, HAVE FRINGE BENEFITS GROWN?

It is by now a commonplace observation that nonwage benefits voluntarily provid
ed by employers have grown dramatically in the post-World War II period. The
Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates that voluntary nonwage benefits (that is,
"other labor income," which includes employer contributions to all voluntary funds
such as pensions, profit-sharing, group health and life, workers' compensation, and
supplemental unemployment) rose from 2.3 percent of private sector total compensa
tion in 1948 to 10.3 percent in 1982.' For the sample of companies surveyed by the
Chamber of Commerce, voluntary contributions to pensions, health insurance, and
* The views stated here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of
the W.E. Upjohn Institute.
1 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, The National Income and Produce Accounts of the
United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), Tables fi.15 and 6.GB
and Survey of Current Business 63 (July 1983), Tables 6.15 and fi.CB For these purposes, total
compensation is defined as the sum of wages and salaries and i^bar labor income that is, ex
cluding contributions to social insurance. (Social insurance contritions are included in the
income and product accounts' measure of "compensation" in Table !;:5 of the accounts.)
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ployers are taking advantage of the lower costs that result from group purchases of
pensions and health benefits, and also that pension and insurance providers are re
ducing overhead and administrative costs by expanding their asset or risk pools
but these changes should probably be viewed as responses to an increasing demand
for benefits rather than as autonomous forces causing that increase.9
Deferral of income has been shown quite convincingly to reduce labor turnover,
and by reference, to improve productivity. 7 But again it is unclear that the desire to
reduce turnover has been important to the growth of nonwage benefits. The only
existing study of this question concludes that considerations of productivity and
turnover are far less potent explanators of pension growth than is the tax treatment
of pension contributions. 8
The most likely causes of fringe-benefits growth, then, are the aging of the labor
force, favorable tax treatment of benefits, and rising real incomes (that is, increases
in income apart from the implications such increases have for the tax rates faced by
households). Several studies have confirmed the influence of all three of these facinfluences on the provision of health, life, and pension benefits.
That several independent researchers using various data sources and somewhat
varying techniques should all arrive at similar conclusions is fairly persuasive. But I
would like to sound at least one warning about the interpretation of these results,
lest they be misconstrued. It should not be inferred from these studies that rising
marginal tax rates are the only, or even the most important, cause of fringe-benefit
8 Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Fringe Benefits 1951 (Washington, D.C.: Cham
ber of Commerce, 1952), Table 3, p. 9; and Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Employee
Benefits 1982 (Washington, D.C.: Chamber of Commerce, 1984), Table 4, p. 8. Figures in the text
equal "pension, insurance, and other agreed upon payments" as a percentage of gross payroll
plus pension, insurance and other agreed upon payments. Thus, legally required payments are
excluded, and rest periods and other payments for time not worked are included as part of the
wage. The Chamber of Commerce sample started out as a rather selective high-benefit sample,
and has become more representative over the years. Note that, unlike the National Income ana
Product Accounts, profit-sharing is not lumped with pension contributions in the Chamber of
Commerce data.
s Table 6.15 in the National Income and Product Accounts and in Survey of Current Business.
* See Rice (1966), Lester (1967), and Long and Scott (1982) for general discussions. The issue of
improving productivity and reducing turnover the so-called agency motive for providing de
ferred benefits have been treated by 1/jgue (1979) and Lazear (1981).
8 See, among others, Freeman (1981), Alpert (1982), Rossiter and Taylor (1982), and Fosu
(1984), and Mincer (1981). Freeman and Mincer differ sharply on the underlying causes of the
union nonwage benefit effect.
6 Mitchell and Andrews (1981) offer an empirical treatment of scale economies of pension pro
vision.
' Schiller and Weiss (1979) and Wolf and Levy (1984).
8 Mumy and Manson (1983).
Alpert (1983), Atrostic (1983), Leibowitz 1983). Long nnd Srott (1983), Sloan and Adamnche
(1983), Taylor and Wilensky (1983), Turner (1981), Vroman and Anderson (1984), and Woodbury
(1983).
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FRINGE-BENEFIT COVERAGE AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
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rent Business (July 1983).
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18 See Smeeding (1983), tables 6.2 and 6.3. This discussion depends heavily
useful paper.
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81 Taylor and Wilensky (1983), table 9-7, p. 177.
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attempted such measurement. 22 But it is clear that the appeal of a tax-cap on
health contributions would wane substantially if the possibilities for substitution be
tween health and pension benefits are strong.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Several studies have found that the growth of fringe benefits in accounted for
largely by the favorable tax treatment they have received, by increases in real
income, and by the going of the labor force. Although most of these studies have
made much of the influence that favorable tax treatment and increasing marginal
tax rates have had on benefit growth, it would be a mistake to believe that tax
treatment is the only cause of fringe-benefit growth, and an even greater mistake to
believe that fringes would vanish if the favorable tax treatment were removed. In
surance and pension plans are a better buy when purchased through the employer,
the institutions to provide benefits efficiently are in place, the work force will con
tinue to age, employers will still make use of deferred benefits as a means of reduc
ing turnover, and real income will continue to rise for all these reasons, removing
the favorable tax treatment of benefits would not kill the goose that laid the golden
egg and jead to the demise of employer-provision of heajth and retirement benefits.
In addition, equity and fairness in the distribution of income and the distribution
of the tax burden suggest the expedience of taxing benefits. Pensions and other de
ferred compensation in particular lessen the equality of the distribution of income,
so that the failure to tax employer contributions to pension tplans violates the ability-to-pay or vertical equity principle of taxation. Also, since individuals with similar
levels of total compensation may receive quite different mixes of wage and nonwage
benefits, the failure to tax nonwage benefits introduces horizontal inequities into
the tax system.
Full or partial taxation of a single specific benefit (such as health-care contribu
tions) is an unattractive alternative to full or partial ti*,*;ation of nil benefits, be
cause of the possibility that employees could substitute svay from the newly taxed
benefit and into still-untaxed benefits (such as pensior ,). Thus, taxation only of
health contributions would not greatly improve the equity of the tax system. Nei
ther, it seems likely, would it raise the amounts of revenue that have been prom
ised, an workers and employers would make adjustments in the benefits package so
as to avoid taxation. Finally, taxation of a single benefit would fail to correct fully
the resource misallocation that has resulted from sheltering fringes from taxationall have in effect been subsidized forms of compensation in the past, and an evenhanded approach to their taxation is needed to mitigate the distorting effects of the
current system.
Munnell (1984) has discussed several alternatives to comprehensive and full
income and payroll taxation of all employer contributions for fringes. Her suggested
"perhaps palatable" alternative, which would limit the proportion of total compen
sation that an employer could contribute without taxation, hns at least three advan
tages. First, it is comprehensive, treating nil benefits equally. Second, its focus on
the proportion of total compensation obviates the sort of wrangling over dollar-sum
caps than has accompanied proposals to limit tax-free contributions to health insur
ance. And third, it would have a minimal (if any) immediate effect on workers and
their benefits, while forestalling further erosion of the tax base. Some such solution
is greatly needed to redress the resource misallocations and inequities that the fa
vored tax status of fringe benefits have generated.
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Chairman PICKLE. Our final panelist is Gail Wilensky, director,
Center for Heath Affairs, and vice president, Domestic Division,
Project HOPE.
STATEMENT OF GAIL K. WILENSKY. VICE PRESIDENT. DOMESTIC
DIVISION, PROJECT HOPE

Ms. WU.F.NSKY. I am vice president of the Domestic Division of
Project HOPE. I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak to
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